INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to examine and assess the participation of the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) in the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with a focus on one legally and politically important question: how their unique position as full WTO members has affected their respective responsibility for the performance of WTO obligations. As it is the case for any other 'mixed' agreement, this joint EU/MS membership of the WTO inevitably prompts the question of 'who is responsible' towards third parties for breaches of WTO law. The question of the EU's international responsibility vis-à-vis that of its Member States has been the subject of intense study in the past years, 1 partly due to the increasingly prominent role of the Union on the international scene but also the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations.
2 And yet within this broader debate, the WTO is often presented in the academic literature as providing both an 'exceptional' and 'exemplary' case-study.
Not only is the WTO one of the rare international fora in which the EU can fully participate as a party in dispute settlement proceedings, but the Union -perhaps not surprisingly as one of the world's leading trade powers-has actually been one of the dominant players in the WTO dispute settlement system: out of the total 496 disputes that have been brought for resolution to the WTO since 1995, the EU (alone) has participated in 312 of them. 3 Therefore, in the context of the WTO dispute settlement system, the question of EU/MS international responsibility is not only of theoretical significance, but also highly relevant in practice. Moreover, the active participation of the EU in the WTO dispute settlement system has been praised as constituting an example of its international actorness and leadership: in fact, the Union has been eager to come forward as single litigant and to assume sole responsibility in WTO disputes, even for alleged breaches by its Member States. Against this background, it has been argued that WTO dispute settlement practice shows how the duty of cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) has allowed the EU to speak with one unified voice, with that voice being the European Commission as porte-parole for the Union. the main contrasting positions will be briefly outlined below as a backdrop to the subsequent analysis of practice in the WTO dispute settlement system.
Question of Apportionment of Obligations
As they currently stand, the general rules of international responsibility do not specifically address the question of determining the respective obligations of an international organisation and its members in cases where both are parties to an international treaty, such as the WTO Agreement for the EU and its Member States. 17 In this respect, the European Commission's position, as elaborated in its submissions on the DARIO to the ILC, has been that the question of apportionment of international obligations should be "entirely determined by the rules of the organisation, since these rules define the tasks and powers of the organisation which possesses its own international legal personality, vis-à-vis those of the member States." 18 Moreover, the EU takes the view that apportionment of obligations "is really the primary question" and should be clearly distinguished from the secondary question of attribution of conduct. 19 Applying this line of reasoning to the case of the WTO, this would mean looking at EU rules on the division of external (i.e., treaty-making) powers in order to determine whether a particular WTO obligation has been entered into by the Union or its Member States. However, given the dynamic and blurry delineation of external competences, it is hardly realistic to expect WTO dispute settlement organs to engage with such complex questions of EU law, nor does it seem desirable from the perspective of safeguarding the 'autonomy' of the EU legal order. 20 Arguably, this issue has now become less complicated with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 21 by virtue of which the Union has acquired exclusive external competence for quasi all matters presently regulated by WTO law. 22 Following the Commission's view, this would imply that, as the sole bearer of WTO obligations in a postLisbon setting, only the EU is capable of incurring international responsibility in the WTO. If this is so, there would be no need to consider the question of attribution: for the Commission, it is impossible that a wrongful act can still be attributed to the EU Member States, once it has been established they are no longer carriers of the relevant WTO European Community require Special Treatment?' in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in memory of Oscar Schachter (Matinus Nijhoff, 2005) . 17 See Article 11 DARIO; Articles 12-13 ARA. 18 Kuijper (2005) , at 216. 19 DARIO Comments (2004) , at 26 (para. 3). 20 For a similar view, see Eeckhout (2006) , at 9. 21 Article 3(1)(e) TFEU. 22 Except for transport services (Article 207(5) TFEU). With regards to the TRIPS Agreement, see Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, judgement of 18 July 2013 (not yet reported), paras. 45-61, where the Court upheld the Commission's view that, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the TRIPS Agreement as a whole now falls within the EU's exclusive external competence under the CCP, even though the specific subject of patentability at issue (Article 27 TRIPS) is covered by shared competence in the field of the internal market (Articles 114 and 118 TFEU). See generally, P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford University Press, 2 nd edition, 2011), chapter 2; and F. Hoffmeister, 'The European Union's Commonobligations. 23 Even if one accepts that this proposition is true as a matter of EU (competence) law, it is not equally valid under public international law. 24 From an international law perspective, so long as both the EU and its Member States remain parties to the WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements), the presumption is that they are each bound by all obligations therein 25 and may not invoke internal rules as justification for non-performance, 26 unless it is otherwise agreed in the treaty or in situations covered by Article 46 VCLTIO. However, as already mentioned, there is no 'Declaration of Competences' or any other textual basis in the WTO Agreement for apportioning obligations and responsibility as between the EU and its Member States. 27 In addition, it is doubtful that Article 46 VCLTIO could be invoked in this case: 28 given the ambiguity as to the division of competences between the EU and its Member States prevailing at the time when the WTO Agreement was concluded, a violation of the rules of the organisation could not have been "manifest" (i.e., objectively evident) to third parties. 29 Consequently, the majority of the 23 DARIO Comments (2004) , at 26, para. 4-5, applying this reasoning to customs matters. 24 See on this point, Advisory Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Case C -53/96 Hermes International v.
FHT Marketing [1998 ] ECR I-3603, para. 14: "This is how matters stand on the Community side but it must not be forgotten that both the Community and the Member States signed all the WTO agreements and are therefore contracting parties vis-à-vis contracting non-member States. And while it is true that the approval of those agreements on behalf of the Community is restricted to 'matters within its competence', it is also true that the Final Act and the WTO Agreement contain no provisions on competence and the Community and its Member States are cited as original members of equal standing. In these circumstances, it should be recognised that the Member States and the Community constitute, vis-à-vis contracting non-member States, a single contracting party or at least contracting parties bearing equal responsibility in the event of failure to implement the agreement. This clearly means that, in that event, the division of competence is a purely internal matter. 30 But does this mean there would be joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States for breaches of WTO law in each and every case? That is not a foregone conclusion: being bound by the same WTO obligation is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States. 31 In the logic of the system of international responsibility as codified by the ILC, breach of an obligation needs to be supplemented by attribution, and therefore the key question is whether the WTO-infringing conduct is attributable to the EU and/or its Member States.
Question of Attribution of Conduct
Unlike for the issue of apportionment, the general rules of international responsibility deal specifically with the attribution of conduct to an international organisation. 32 Article 6 DARIO provides that conduct of an organ or agent of an international organisation shall be attributed to it, while Article 7 DARIO extends such an attribution to the organisation for the conduct of an organ of a State in cases where it is 'placed at the disposal of' the organisation and if the latter exercises 'effective control' over such conduct. However, the European Commission and some scholars have argued that these attribution rules are not flexible enough to accommodate the distinctive traits of the Union's constitutional structure and functioning.
33
This concern is not entirely misplaced, as applying the DARIO rules on attribution to the EU/MS relationship would limit the situations in which the Union incurs (sole) responsibility for breaches of WTO law. 34 Due to the multilevel and decentralised implementation of most areas of EU law (i.e., so-called 'executive federalism'), 35 33 See e.g., Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013) , at 69. 34 Note, however, that Chapter IV DARIO provides for a number of situations in which the responsibility of an international organization may arise in connection with the act of a State, presumably without attribution, including where the international organization "aids or assist a State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act (Article 14) or "circumvents one of its international obligations" through decisions or authorizations addressed to its members (Article 17), which could arguably be applicable to the EU/MS relationship. However, unlike Articles 6-7 DARIO where responsibility through attribution seems to be a 'blackor-white' question (i.e., either the organization or the State), Chapter IV DARIO appears to create an additional layer of responsibility for the organization without prejudice to that of the State (Article 19), leading therefore to joint responsibility. See further, Hoffmeister (2010), at 727 and Nollkaemper (2013), at 323-324.law, and thus national authorities are likely to be more visible to third parties as the factual actor of an alleged WTO breach. Customs administration constitutes the most obvious example of this special character of the Union's 'executive federalism': even though this is a core EU exclusive competence, there is no EU customs service but 28 national customs administrations that implement (directly applicable) EU customs legislation. As the European Commission aptly noted in its comments to the ILC, " [t] he fact that the implementation of [EU] law, even in areas of its exclusive competence, is normally carried out by the member States and their authorities, poses the question as to … when the [EU] as such is responsible not only for acts committed by its organs, but also for actions of the member States and their authorities." 37 Yet, it is commonly accepted that Article 7 DARIO does not provide an appropriate basis for attributing acts of the Member States when implementing EU law to the Union: its 'normative control' 38 over Member States' conduct is generally considered to fall short of the 'effective control' test in that provision. 39 Alternatively, the EU would need to constantly rely on the exception provided for in Article 9 DARIO so as to 'acknowledge and adopt' conduct of its Member States as its own. 40 That being so, it is understandable to some extent that the European Commission pressed for a special rule of attribution of internationally wrongful acts during the ILC codification process, 41 which was initially opposed by the Special Rapporteur Gaja and eventually led to the introduction of Article 64 DARIO on lex specialis, leaving open the possibility that the general rules on responsibility may be set aside in the case of the EU and its Member States.
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As seen earlier for the question of apportionment, the EU equally considers that attribution of conduct should reflect the internal division of competences. 40 Article 9 DARIO provides: "Conduct which is not attributable to an international organization under articles 6 to 8 shall nevertheless be considered an act of that organization under international law if and to the extent that the organization acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own." For a criticism, see Paasivirta and P.J. Kuijper (2005) , at 217. 41 For a more detailed account, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 728-729. 42 Article 64 DARIO provides: "These draft articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of an international organization … are governed by special rules of international law. Such special rules of international law may be contained in the rules of the organization applicable to the relations between an international organization and its members." (emphasis added). The commentary thereto explicitly records that there is a variety of opinions concerning the possible existence of a special rule with respect to the attribution to the EU of conduct of the Member States when they implement binding acts of the Union. For a more detailed account, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 728-729. 43 See section 3.2 below for further discussion. 44 DARIO Comments (2004) , at 29 (para. 5).
(external) competence such as the CCP, "only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts." 45 Indeed, a number of scholars have suggested that, if necessary, Article 64 DARIO should be invoked to defend this competencebased approach to attribution and international responsibility. 46 The problem of attribution of Member States' conduct to the Union should be further refined, though. In support of its position, the Commission often relies on the example of customs legislation, which is a purely external matter and extensively harmonised though EU Regulations that are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in the Member States. 47 Put differently, EU customs legislation clearly orders what the Member States have to do and they have no choice but to implement it. In these particular circumstances where Member States' conduct is strictly confined to implementing EU law, it is not difficult to accept that national customs authorities act de facto as organs of the Union. Yet, this perfect example of EU executive federalism is not necessarily applicable to all areas covered by WTO law. Part of the reason for this is that the exclusive EU external competence under the CCP is not fully matched by an exclusive competence to regulate internally. As Eeckhout rightly suggests, the taxation of products provides a case in point: externally, such taxation is subject to Article III GATT falling under exclusive EU external competence, whereas internally Member States retain competence for certain forms of taxation that are not harmonised or even regulated at EU level. 48 When Member States impose such taxes through independent national legislation, can they still be regarded as functionally acting as organs of the Union?
Similar doubts may arise in other 'grey areas' where, even though Member States do act within the scope of EU law, the degree of the Union's normative control over their conduct is more limited than in the context of implementing EU Regulations. One example is State aid, which is subject to WTO disciplines on subsidies: unlike 'classical' executive federalism, EU Member States are not here acting to execute a certain harmonised EU rule, but rather individually providing aid within certain boundaries set by EU law. 49 In addition, the link between Member States' conduct and EU law may not always be straightforward when they act to implement EU Directives, as these are only binding with respect to the aim(s) pursued but leave some discretion as to the form and method of implementation, 50 and thus a varied application is likely to result across EU Member States. Moreover, particularly in the fields of consumer and environmental protection, it is not uncommon for the EU to adopt so-called minimum harmonisation Directives setting out standards that national legislations must meet but may exceed if a given Member State so desires: 51 54 The question thus arises as to whether such a restricted EU normative authority over Member States' conduct may be enough to attribute it to the Union for the purposes of international responsibility. 55 Against this background, the next section turns to analyse how the WTO dispute settlement has tackled the joint membership of the EU and its Member States. To what extent have these theoretical questions of responsibility been a controversial issue in practice? Or conversely, have third parties in the WTO de facto accepted the EU's assertion of exclusive responsibility for breaches of WTO law, even by its Member States?
3) EU/MS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WTO -A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE IN PRACTICE?
3.1.
The Broad Picture
As reflected in Table 1 below, the 'mixed' EU/MS membership of the WTO has been hardly visible in dispute settlement practice. . 56 This number seeks to capture the number of WTO disputes in which the EU sole responsibility was invoked by the third parties concerned. It thus reflects the total 'request for consultations' (i.e., this being the first step in WTO dispute settlement procedures; Article 4 DSU) addressed exclusively to the EU. Note, however, that in some of these cases, a 'mutually agreed solution' was reached by parties to the dispute, while a considerable number of other cases have been formally pending for years at consultations stage. 57 This number seeks to capture the number of WTO disputes in which the 'joint' responsibility of the EU and its Member States was invoked by the third parties concerned. It thus reflects the total 'request for consultations' addressed to the EU jointly with one or more of its Member States (e.g., WT/DS375-377, European Communities and its Member States -Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products), and those addressed to the EU in parallel to claims on the same subject-matter addressed to MS (e.g., WT/DS62, EC -Customs Classification of Computer Equipment, in which the US also brought separate claims against Ireland (WT/DS68) and the UK (WT/DS67)).
MS (individual claims)
1 58 10 59 -11
At a first glance, the EU undoubtedly stands out as one of the most active users of the WTO dispute settlement system: out of the total 496 disputes that have been brought for resolution to the WTO since 1995, 60 the Union (alone) has participated either as a complainant (95), a respondent (68) or third party (149) in 312 of them. By way of comparison, the United States (US), as the other key player in the WTO dispute settlement system, has participated in a total of 354 WTO cases. 61 In contrast, the EU Member States (individually) have played a minimal and passive role in WTO dispute settlement:
62 to date, none has initiated a dispute against a third country 63 or intervened as a third party in any WTO case, while only some have been occasionally targeted as individual respondents by another WTO member (i.e., the US in all 10 cases). 64 However, for the purpose of our discussion, it appears pertinent to examine more in depth the statistics concerning passive litigation -i.e., EU/MS acting as a respondent jointly or individually-as an indicator of how the question of EU/MS international responsibility has been approached by third parties and dispute settlement organs in the WTO. In doing so, it seems also interesting to break down such statistics into the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon period 65 as a means to gauging whether, and if so how, the internal transfer of exclusive 58 See n 63 below 59 This number reflects the total 'request for consultations' addressed only to individual EU Member States (see n 64 below), even though the EU may have intervened as a party to negotiate a 'mutually agreed solution' to the dispute (see nn 82-83 below). 62 The lack of active litigation by EU Member States in the WTO dispute settlement system may be due to purely political/institutional reasons, but may also be explained by legal constraints resulting from EU law, and in particular the duty of cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU): for a discussion, see Delgado Casteleiro and Larik Table 2 , 'pre-Lisbon' period refers to all WTO disputes initiated between 1 January 1995 and 1 January 2008, whereas 'post-Lisbon period' to those initiated between 1 January 2008 and 1 March 2015. The underlying competence to the EU for all CCP matters has affected the approach to EU/MS international responsibility in the practice of WTO dispute settlement.
3.2.
Pre-Lisbon Practice -Pragmatic Approach to EU (exclusive) Responsibility A glimpse at Table 2 below would seem to support the view that, "[i]n fact, the whole discussion on the [joint responsibility] of the EU and its Member States in the WTO is put aside in favour of the sole responsibility of the Union in the WTO dispute settlement system", 66 particularly during the pre-Lisbon period. shipbuilding sector), which had been explicitly authorised by the European Commission. 74 After formally noting that Korea had made the panel request with respect to the European Union only, 75 the Panel accepted the EU's sole responsibility for the national aid schemes, emphasising two key elements: (i) the EU Regulation and Commission's decisions were the "legal authority" under which EU Member States provided aid; and (ii) in the event of a finding of WTO-inconsistency, the EU had declared to assume responsibility for "any actions that may be required to bring into conformity the measures at issue", removing thereby the "legal basis for granting any further aid".
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Turning to the ten WTO disputes against individual Member States, these were all brought (perhaps non-coincidentally) by the United States and date back to the early years of the WTO dispute settlement system (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . Some of these cases concerned claims under the GATS and TRIPS, and to some extent may be genuinely motivated by the lack of legal clarity, which prevailed at that time following Opinion 1/94, as to the exact division of competences -and thus, respective obligations-between the EU and its Member States in these fields of WTO law. 77 However, others involved claims in areas that were unequivocally held in Opinion 1/94 to fully fall under EU exclusive external competence (i.e., the GATT and the SCM Agreement), 78 and may well have been motivated by a strategic attempt to weaken European unity and leadership in the WTO. 79 In any event, no WTO panel has pronounced itself on the responsibility of EU Member States in these disputes, as six of them have been formally pending for years at consultations stage, 80 while in the other four a 'mutually agreed solution' was reached. Nevertheless, it is significant that in all but one 81 of the cases resulting in a 'mutually agreed solution', this was achieved with the EU intervening as a negotiating/responding party, not only for matters falling under its exclusive external competence, 82 but also for issues revolving around the application of the TRIPS agreement where the extent of its competence was not entirely clear in this pre-Lisbon setting.
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Most significant for our purposes, only in a few cases (5) have third parties formally invoked the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States for alleged breaches of WTO law, by targeting them together (1) or by directing parallel claims on the same subject-matter to each of them separately (4).
84 EC -Computer Equipment (1998) 85 was the first case in which the joint EU/MS membership of the WTO caused controversy as to who was responsible in panel proceedings. The case concerned the tariff treatment of certain computer equipment, which the US claimed was in breach of the tariff concessions contained in the EU Schedule under Article II:1 GATT. Thus, it typically illustrates the kind of responsibility question that may arise in the context of 'classical' EU executive federalism -i.e., who is responsible for acts of Member States custom authorities in situations where they functionally act as organs of the Union? Unsurprisingly, the EU sought to assert its exclusive responsibility for any GATT infringement, based on its understanding that apportionment of obligations and attribution of conduct in the context of international responsibility should follow the delimitation of competences under EU law. 86 In particular, the EU stressed that it was an "original member of the WTO in its own right" and that the tariff concessions "were bound in the GATT 1994 […] exclusively at the level of the [EU] and not at the level of individual member States."
87
Positioning itself as the only bearer of the GATT obligations in question, the EU declared its readiness to assume the "entire responsibility for all measures in the area of tariff concessions", 88 whether the measure complained about had been taken at EU level or at the level of the Member States. Significantly, the Union went further to support its full responsibility by linking the internal division of competences with the question of who can remedy the alleged wrongs: "it was exclusively competent for the subject matter concerned and thus the only entity in a position to repair the possible breach" 89 -i.e., the only entity capable of ensuring the necessary restitution under WTO dispute settlement rules. 90 The US, on the other hand, submitted that both the EU and two of its Member States were responsible for the allegedly wrongful tariff treatment, arguing that Ireland and the UK were "independent members" of the WTO and equally bound by the EU Schedule under the GATT. 91 For the US, the internal transfer of powers for tariff matters from the Member States to the EU was irrelevant externally, and did not result in "fewer rights and obligations being allotted to the Member States" under WTO law.
92 Furthermore, the US took the view that the conduct of the Irish and UK customs administrations was attributable to those two States, emphasising that they were told during consultations with the EU that it "could not control the classification practices of member State customs authorities." 93 The Panel, however, avoided addressing explicitly the US request to clarify the responsibility of the respective defendants and instead put forward compromise language that could satisfy both parties: "since the
94 On the one hand, the formula 'customs authorities in the European Union' could be read as endorsing the EU's proposition that Member States customs authorities act functionally as EU organs when implementing EU law, 95 and thus responsibility for their conduct should be solely attributed to the EU. 96 On the other hand, the Panel sided with the US in that the relevant EU Schedule was equally binding on both the EU and its Member States, 97 presumably implying all bear international responsibility for any breaches thereof, even if this is an area of EU exclusive competence. Nevertheless, the Panel ultimately found that it was the Union alone to have "acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article II GATT" and addressed recommendations to the EU only. 92 Ibid., para. 4.14. 93 Ibid., para. 4.12. Originally, the US tried to establish separate parallel WTO panels against the EU and the two Member States, but an agreement was reached between the parties to have one panel considering all claims (paras 1.1-1.11). 94 Ibid., para. 8. 16 . 95 This federal-type agency argument was further advanced by the EU and accepted by the WTO panel in European Communities -Selected Customs Matters, Report of the Panel, WT/DS315/R, adopted (as modified) 11 December 2006 [EC -Selected Customs Matters], paras. 7547-7553. However, this case touched only indirectly upon the issue of EU/MS international responsibility, given that the US violation claims under Article X:3 GATT were only addressed against the EU, and not against the EU Member States themselves. This can be easily explained by the fact that the US was directly challenging the decentralised nature of the EU's system of customs administration as being contrary to the uniformity and prompt dispute resolution requirements of Article X:3 GATT. Thus, the preliminary issue that was raised was whether the EU was able to discharge its obligations under Article X:3 GATT through the Member States, which the Panel found to be the case. 96 For a similar view, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 732. 97 This was also the position of the Panel in EC -Selected Customs Matters (2006), para. 7.548: "it would appear that the [EU] as well as its constituent member States concurrently bear the obligations contained in the WTO Agreements, including those contained in Article X:3(b) of the GATT 1994." (emphasis added) 98 Ibid., paras. 9.1-9.2 (emphasis added). The issue of who was the proper respondent on the EU/MS side was not raised again on appeal: see EC -Computer Equipment (1998), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998, para. 57.
The other borderline case of this pre-Lisbon 99 period in which the joint responsibility of the EU/MS was invoked and addressed by a WTO panel was the famous EC and Certain Member States -Large Civil Aircraft (2011), 100 which was initiated by the United States back in 2004 but this time directing claims against the EU and four of its Member States together (Germany, France, Spain and the UK). The US claimed they had all provided subsidies separately and in parallel to Airbus large civil aircraft 101 in contravention of "their obligations" under the GATT and SCM Agreement. 102 Again not surprisingly from an EU law standpoint, the Union requested that the Panel determine, as a preliminary matter, that the EU was the "only proper respondent" in the dispute, stressing that it was not simply "representing" the Member States in the proceedings, but took "full responsibility" for their actions. 103 However, the EU's argumentation was essentially limited to restating that the alleged GATT/SCM violations related to matters within its exclusive competence and for which it bears sole responsibility in the WTO, 104 with no indication as to how it would ensure compliance with any potentially adverse Panel's recommendations also by its Member States in this specific case.
The Panel rejected the EU request endorsing instead the formal argument advanced by the US that consultations and panel requests had been made with respect to the four Member States "in addition" to the EU: "[e]ach of these five is, in its own right, a Member of the WTO, with all the rights and obligations pertaining to such membership, including the obligation to respond to claims made against it by another WTO Member."
105 For the Panel, the 'rules of the organisation' -i.e., the internal division of powers-were of no relevance for the purpose of apportioning WTO obligations and allocating responsibility for any possible breach thereof between the EU and its Member States. Notably, it reasoned that the fact that the four Member States had chosen not to directly defend their interests in the dispute by making oral and written submissions separate from those of the EU was "a matter entirely within their discretion" and subject to their obligations under EU law, but did "not affect their rights or status as respondent parties" under WTO law. 106 Taking this position a step forward, it held that: "whatever responsibility the [ 101 The principal measure at issue were the so-called "Launch Aid" or "Member State Financing" (LA/MFS) arrangements, provided by France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom to Airbus for the development of large civil aircraft (LCA). Other measures challenged were: (i) Loans provided through the European Investment Bank to Airbus for LCA design, development, and other purposes; (iii) infrastructure and infrastructure-related grants to Airbus provided by Member State authorities; (iv) the provision to Airbus of equity infusions, debt forgiveness, and grants through government-owned and government-controlled banks; (v) Against the backdrop of the pre-Lisbon practice just examined, it is readily apparent from Table 2 that joint EU/MS membership of the WTO is becoming much more visible in dispute settlement practice post-Lisbon -even if this may be somehow counterintuitive from an EU law perspective with the Union having been granted exclusive external competence for all CCP matters. At the outset, two main observations can be made: first, complaints addressed jointly to the EU and one or more of its Member States (9) are no longer the exception but almost as common as complaints directed against the EU alone (14); and second, it is no longer just the US bringing such joint complaints, but also other active players in the WTO dispute settlement system (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Japan and Russia). Out of the nine cases in which the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States has been formally invoked, only one 109 has led to the adoption of a WTO panel report, while the others appear still at consultations/panel request stage.
110 Therefore, it is too early to appraise the significance of this trend in WTO dispute settlement practice. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that these cases concern claims under WTO covered agreements falling within the 'old' (e.g., GATT, TBT, SCM Agreements) and 'new' EU exclusive external 108 Ibid., para. 8. competence (i.e., GATS and TRIPS) alike, and increasingly involve Member States measures taken in the framework of EU legislation in the field of energy and climate change policies.
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At the time of writing, the issue of EU/MS joint responsibility has only been addressed by the WTO panel in the EC -IT Products (2010) dispute concerning the tariff treatment of certain information technology products, which the US, Japan and Chinese Taipei claimed was in breach of the EU's and its Member States' obligations under (inter alia) Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) GATT as it did not respect their commitments to provide duty-free treatment for these products under the Information Technology Agreement (ITA). 112 The complainants addressed the consultations and panel requests jointly to the EU and its Member States, on grounds that both the EU and its Member States played a role in the application of the duties concerned. The complainants submitted that, while the Union had promulgated the challenged measures, customs authorities of the Member States, in implementing these EU regulations, issued 'Binding Tariff Information' decisions specifying the customs classification code and applied customs duties to the products at issue. They further argued that the "internal legal relationship" between the EU and its Member States "cannot diminish the rights of other WTO members", including under the DSU to bring claims against the EU Member States as WTO members in their own right. 113 However, the EU notified the Panel that it would participate as sole respondent in the proceedings and bear sole responsibility for any GATT breach. As in the EC -Computer Equipment (1998) dispute discussed above, the EU's assertion of exclusive responsibility was here supported by a combination of internal and WTO-based legal arguments. As could be expected, the Union reiterated its exclusive competence under EU law for all tariff matters, arguing that the role of national customs authorities was limited to applying measures previously enacted at EU level. But critically, it also stressed that this meant, from a WTO law perspective, that only the EU could take "remedial action" to implement the Panel's recommendations to the extent a GATT violation were determined, and thus "addressing any recommendations to each [EU] Member State would serve no useful purpose." 114 In addition, the Union sought to assure the Panel that the EU Member States would be required, as a matter of EU law, to apply any such implementing measures taken at EU level. 115 The Panel made its recommendations to the EU only, hiding behind a rather 'formalistic' argument (i.e., an "as such" challenge), but ultimately persuaded that EU sole responsibility will bring a satisfactory settlement of this specific dispute: 114 Ibid., para. 7.80. 115 Ibid., para. 7.80.
" […] we note that the complainants have framed their claims as challenging the [EU] measures "as such" and have confirmed to the Panel that they are not making claims with respect to specific applications of those measures by national customs authorities of any member States. Under the circumstances, the Panel considers that it is not required to make, and does not make, findings with respect to member States' application of the [EU] measures that were challenged "as such" in this dispute. Moreover, we are of the view that findings with respect to the measures adopted by the [EU] will provide a positive solution to the dispute." (2011)). Second, in these few instances where EU/MS responsibility was contentious, what caused contention was the Union's eagerness to be held responsible in lieu of its Member States, and not them seeking to hide behind each other so as to evade international responsibility altogether. 117 Put differently, concerns over 'accountability gaps' have not really materialised in EU/MS practice within the WTO dispute settlement system. That being so, in which ways does this contribution seek to offer a more nuanced assessment of the EU's leading role in WTO dispute settlement vis-à-vis that found in the literature?
The first qualification made here concerns the degree to which the EU's assertion of exclusive participation and responsibility has been accepted by other WTO members and scrutinised by WTO dispute settlement organs. In this regard, it has been argued that WTO dispute settlement practice "has gone a long way in the direction of attributing the acts of the Member States to EU, in particular when the Member States implement EU law or when their acts fall within the scope of EU legislation."
118 Such a conclusion would seem premature for a number of reasons. First, as we have seen, out of the total 68 WTO disputes in which the EU was targeted as sole respondent, only a few actually raised this sensitive question of attribution of conduct of the EU Member States to the Union. Since the vast majority of these cases involved complaints against EU measures only -rather than specific applications thereof by the Member States, there was no ambiguity that the Union bore sole responsibility for the alleged WTO-inconsistency of such acts. 119 Second, there were certainly some instances, particularly in the pre-Lisbon period, in which WTO members could have challenged but instead tacitly accepted EU exclusive responsibility for actions of the Member
States taken under its (limited) normative authority -notably, EC -Asbestos (2001), ECCommercial Vessels (2005) and EC -Biotech (2006).
And it is also true that WTO panels have refrained from interfering with this course of action insofar as it was acquiesced to by WTO members. In this sense, the approach to EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO has been rightly described as being marked by both assertiveness of the Union and pragmatism of all parties involved. 120 However, this does not necessarily set a precedent for future disputes. 121 Indeed, our examination of post-Lisbon practice reveals that WTO members have increasingly brought joint complaints when challenging measures adopted by the Member States within the normative sphere of EU law, 122 and it remains to be seen how these claims of joint EU/MS responsibility are dealt with if actually contested in WTO panel proceedings.
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The second refinement made here pertains to the degree to which EU competence rules have been considered a relevant criterion for the purpose of allocating EU/MS international responsibility, in the three cases in which this proved a controversial issue before WTO panels. In this regard, it has been rightly noted that the approach of WTO panels has not been entirely consistent. 124 Understandingly from an international law perspective, WTO panels have consistently taken the position that internal transfers of powers do not affect the validity of WTO obligations for EU Member States: as full WTO members in their own right, they are bound by the entire WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements), in spite of whatever competence the Union may have for parts thereof as a matter of EU law. 125 In other words, the 'rules of the organisation' are largely irrelevant for the question of apportioning WTO obligations. Conversely, the available WTO jurisprudence is less clear on the extent to which the 'rules of the organisation' may be relevant to the question of attributing acts of the Member States to the Union. Whereas in cases of classical EU executive federalism (i.e., ECComputer Equipment (1998) and EC -IT Products (2010)) WTO panels have ultimately accepted the Union's sole responsibility for acts of its Member States when implementing EU (customs) legislation found in violation of the GATT, the Panel in EC -Large Civil Aircraft (2011)) drew a line in this regard and held both the EU and its Member States responsible for breaches of the SCM Agreement. These different findings cannot be easily explained in light of the internal allocation of competences, since both the GATT and the SCM Agreement have long been within the exclusive external competence of the Union. Yet, as will be argued next, this case law may appear less inconsistent if viewed from the perspective of a WTO panel and its very purpose in assigning responsibility for an internationally wrongful act in the specific treaty context of the WTO.
4) EU/MS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WTO -A MODEL, OR A CASE APART?

A 'Competence Model', or a 'Competence/Remedy Model'?
In comparing the different approaches to EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO and under the European Convention on Human Rights, Kuijper aptly qualifies the relative impact of the EU's internal rules on determinations of international responsibility. He argues that it is not just internal factors, such as the scope of EU powers and whether the Member States may be seen as de facto Union organs in certain instances, which determine the degree to which the EU will bear sole or joint responsibility. 126 Rather, these internal elements "will be strongly vary in impact on the final questions of attribution and responsibility" depending on the specific treaty regime in which the responsibility of the EU and/or its Member States is invoked, and in particular the prevailing remedy for an internationally wrongful act preferred by the regime in question. 127 In the context of the WTO, both the legal texts and the practice of the dispute settlement organs clearly attach a strong preference for juridical restitutioni.e., the 'prompt' withdrawal (or modification) of the WTO-inconsistent measure and continued performance of WTO obligations. 128 In such a system where the primary consequence of international responsibility is the return to legality, the key question becomes who (i.e., the EU or the Member States, or both) has the actual power to undo the wrongful act and ensure conformity to existing WTO obligations. In this sense, as rightly pointed out by Nollkaemper, the role of power in determining international responsibility (whether joint or not) is a fundamental one.
129 Put simply, why would WTO dispute settlement organs bother to assign responsibility to a WTO member that does not hold the power to remove (or modify) the measure found WTO-inconsistent?
That being said, does it necessarily follow that the EU is the one and only able to provide for restitution and ensure performance of WTO obligations in all instances? This would seem to be the view taken by Kuijper and Paasivirta in suggesting the so-called 'competence model' for managing EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO. In their opinion, the relevant WTO member is the Union and not the Member States: given the near-exclusive EU external competence for WTO matters post-Lisbon, only its institutions can provide for the necessary restitution and thus the Union should be solely responsible for the WTO-inconsistency of all acts taken in the sphere of EU law, including by its Member States. 130 But if this proposition is accepted, what would be the legal justification for the Member States to remain independent members of the WTO, given they are claimed entirely incompetent to fulfill one of the key obligations of that membership -i.e., to ensure the conformity of their laws, regulations and administrative procedures with WTO obligations 131 
?
In reality, the proposed 'competence model' may need some refinement, as evidenced by the EU's own argumentation in the three WTO cases previously discussed in which EU/MS responsibility proved contentious in panel proceedings. On the one hand, the two premises underlying the 'competence model' appear perfectly sensible when applied to situations of classical EU executive federalism such as those posed by the EC -Computer Equipment (1998) and EC -IT Products (2010) disputes involving EU customs legislation. In both cases, it was plainly clear that: first, the EU had required the Member States to act inconsistently with WTO law -i.e., by adopting the challenged (directly applicable) regulations that Member States have no choice but to apply and which left no room for discretion in terms of implementation; and second, the EU was the only entity with the actual power to provide restitution -i.e., to modify/withdraw the regulations found WTO-inconsistent. Under these circumstances where the Union has full ex-ante and ex-post normative control over Member State action, it would not be very efficient nor provide much legal certainty from a third-party perspective, to hold EU Member States responsible as they do not have any individual power to undo the wrongful situation and ensure performance of WTO obligations.
On the other hand, it is less straightforward whether these two assumptions underpinning the 'competence model' can be upheld as we move away from tariffs and customs matters into other areas of WTO law, which are not so extensively regulated at EU level and where the role of the EU Member States is not strictly confined to executing EU law. This point is well illustrated by the EC -Large Civil Aircraft (2011) dispute. First, it is generally the case that, in the field of State aid, the EU does not require but at most authorises Member States to provide aid under certain conditions, 132 and therefore Member States do enjoy some level of discretion in whether or not they act in contravention of the SCM Agreement. Moreover, in this particular dispute, the EU did not point to any Commission state aid decision actually authorising the separate subsidies granted by the Member States, 133 and it has indeed been reported that such subsidies were not subject to a specific EU authorisation. 134 This being so, it would be hard to see how the EU could claim to exercise normative control over Member State subsidising action where there appears to be no basis in EU law for assessing the substantive legality of such action. 135 Indeed, even in an area where the EU has exclusive competence both externally and internally, 136 it may be possible for Member States to act outside the scope of EU normative authority in a manner that violates the SCM Agreement: a key reason for this is that the Commission's control powers are limited to government support that constitutes 'State aid', which is a narrower concept than the WTO's notion of 'subsidy'. 137 Second, in terms of remedial action, the EU did not attempt to argue that it was 132 See n 49 above. 133 (ii) the intervention gives the recipient an advantage on a selective basis; (iii) competition has been or may be distorted; (iv) the intervention is likely to affect trade between Member States. Whereas (i) and (ii) resemble the WTO criteria of 'financial contribution by a government/public body conferring a benefit' (Annex 1.1) and 'specificity' (Articles 1.2 and 2) for determining the existence of a 'subsidy' under the SCM Agreement, WTO disciplines are clearly not confined to government support measures that distort competition and trade within the EU (i.e., conditions (iii) and (iv) for 'State aid'), but more broadly apply to subsidies that affect international trade (e.g., export and import substitution subsidies prohibited under Article best placed to implement the Panel's recommendations. In fact, it is far from evident that the Union alone could have remedied the wrongful situation, particularly for those "Member State Financing" (or "Launch Aid") measures that the Panel found to constitute a prohibited (export) subsidy under Article 3.1(a) SCM Agreement and had to be withdrawn within 90 days. 138 Under these circumstances, it appears perfectly sensible for the Panel to address individual recommendations to each subsidising EU Member State, as they had actual power and full discretion to withdraw their WTO-inconsistent subsidies with no need for any prior EU legislative action.
Therefore, the EC -Large Civil Aircraft (2011) dispute highlights that a perfect match between EU exclusive external competence for WTO matters and exclusive remedial capacity for any breach of WTO law, which underlies the 'competence model', cannot simply be taken for granted. The question remains, however, whether this may be considered a marginal case due to the peculiarities of EU State aid rules, or conversely whether similar doubts as to the EU's exclusive ability to provide restitution could arise in other fields of WTO law. Arguably, this could also become an issue in WTO disputes involving acts of the Member States apparently aimed at implementing EU Directives, where it can be highly complex, particularly for a third party, to identify whether the alleged WTO-inconsistent measure was required by EU law, or instead results from an autonomous decision of the Member States, or indeed implicates both. 139 A case in point is the recent complaint brought by Argentina against the EU and some of its Member States regarding certain measures affecting the marketing of biodiesel products and supporting the biodiesel industry. 140 On the one hand, the EU seems clearly responsible for GATT/TBT claims against the 'sustainability criteria' for biofuels and bioliquids: 141 these are established as mandatory common standards in the EU Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality Directives 142 -i.e., only conforming biofuels and bioliquids may count towards meeting the obligatory national renewable energy targets set out for each Member States 143 and/or be eligible for financial support-and therefore only the EU is in a position to modify (or withdraw) these criteria if found WTO-inconsistent. On the other hand, it is less obvious whether the Union is equally responsible for GATT/SCM claims against tax exemptions/reductions on such 'sustainable' biofuels allegedly applied by some EU Member States:
144 these tax incentives are not, strictly speaking, required by EU law 145 and therefore Member States retain the power to withdraw them if found WTO-inconsistent. In fact, this case raises the type of responsibility question that was pragmatically avoided in the ECBiotech (2006) dispute discussed above and, should it reach panel proceedings, may provide a first opportunity for WTO dispute settlement organs to actually rule on the question of who is responsible for conduct of the Member States that is authorised in EU Directives. 146 In addition, one should bear in mind that there is no strict parallelism between EU exclusive external competence in the field of the CCP and the distribution of internal regulatory competences between the Union and its Member States. 147 To put it differently, even if it is accepted that the Union has exclusive treaty-making powers for (nearly) all WTO matters, it does not have exclusive treaty-infringing powers. There are some important policy fields covered by WTO law that have been only partially regulated at EU level and where Member States retain considerable regulatory autonomy internally: one example seen earlier is internal taxation (covered by GATT) 148 and another patent law (covered by TRIPS). 149 In these areas, it could well be that an act of a EU Member State outside the scope of EU legislation infringes WTO law. If presented with such a scenario, proponents of EU exclusive responsibility may still argue that the Union has internal control mechanisms to effectively ensure compliance with an adverse WTO ruling, 150 notably by initiating infringement proceedings against the Member State(s) concerned. 151 However, from the perspective of the WTO dispute settlement organs, why would this be any more effective than holding the infringing EU Member State directly responsible?
To sum up, when approaching EU/MS responsibility for breaches of WTO law, the key practical question is who has the actual power to provide juridical restitution and secure performance of WTO obligations, as underscored by the 'competence/remedy' model suggested here. From this angle, the internal distribution of competences becomes a relevant criterion for the purposes of attributing EU/MS international responsibility: complaining parties would generally address their claims, 152 and WTO dispute settlement organs their findings, based on their assessment of who is in the best position to withdraw or amend the WTOinconsistent measure. 153 However, and importantly, it does not follow that the EU -and not its Member States-is the relevant WTO member in each and every case just because it has exclusive external competence for WTO matters. As we have seen, it is not a foregone conclusion that EU Member States have no role to play in ensuring conformity of their laws, regulations and administrative practices with WTO law, and particularly as we move away from highly integrated areas of the CCP. So as long as they remain independent members of the WTO, EU Member States can be targeted as respondents and incur responsibility for their WTO-infringing conduct, particularly where they retain an actual power to undo the wrongful situation -i.e., because EU normative control over their action is either limited or absent altogether. That being so, there appears to be no compelling grounds why WTO dispute settlement organs should instead rely on the Commission's infringement action or other internal enforcement mechanisms so as to ensure due performance by the Member States of their WTO obligations.
A Case Apart?
The aforementioned 'competence/remedy' model to EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO inevitably raises the question as to whether the internal division of powers between 149 Article 118 TFEU provides the legal basis for the creation of European intellectual property rights and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements. 154 Thus, in this treaty context, the key question is most often who should pay monetary damages awarded by arbitral tribunals, and not so much who holds the power to undo a wrongful act. 155 As exposed below, even though foreign direct investment (FDI) is also in an area of exclusive EU external competence, 156 the Union seems here less eager to assume exclusive responsibility at all costs. The reasons for this are spelled out in the recently adopted EU Regulation establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to State-investor dispute settlement, 157 but are somehow contradictory. On the one hand, the Regulation reaffirms the view that international responsibility should follow the internal division of powers: given that the EU is exclusively competent to assume international obligations in the field of FDI, only the EU can in principle act as a respondent and be held internationally responsible for violations of FDI provisions, "irrespective of whether the treatment at issue is afforded by the Union itself or by a Member State."
158 On the other hand, the Regulation seeks to distinguish between this external responsibility under public international law and the allocation of financial responsibility as an internal EU law matter, decided irrespective of international responsibility:
"Where the Union … has international responsibility for the treatment afforded, it will be expected, as a matter of international law, to pay any adverse award and bear the costs of any dispute. However, an adverse award may potentially flow either from treatment afforded by the Union itself or from treatment afforded by a Member State. It would as a consequence be inequitable if awards and the costs of arbitration were emphasis here is not so much on who is competent for contracting the international investment obligation in question, but rather on whether a provision in EU law is actually at the origin of the breach. Whereas this more cautious approach in asserting EU exclusive responsibility vis-à-vis that taken in the WTO may be explained by moral hazard concerns, 166 it is nonetheless at odds with the Union's own argument that the scope of EU exclusive external powers should be the decisive factor for assigning EU/MS responsibility under mixed agreements.
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5) CONCLUSIONS
It is largely undisputed that the European Union has played a prominent role in the WTO dispute settlement system over the past two decades. As one of the rare international fora where the EU is actually allowed to fully participate in dispute settlement proceedings, it is not surprising that the Union has been eager to stand as a 'responsible' -if not 'overresponsible'-actor in the multilateral trading system, even if not always compliant with WTO law. And yet, this 'success story' should not lead us to overstate neither the degree to which third parties have accepted the EU's eagerness to assume exclusive responsibility for breaches of WTO law by its Member States, nor the relative impact of its own competence rules on determinations of EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO. The main reason calling for a more qualified assessment is that we simply do not have (as of yet) well-established authoritative WTO jurisprudence on the sensitive question of when can Member State conduct be attributed to the Union: 168 as we have seen, it has been raised and adjudicated only on three occasions in WTO panel proceedings and never thus far in Appellate Body proceedings. In addition, WTO dispute settlement practice reveals that joint complaints against the EU and its Member States have not ceased, even if the Union has been granted exclusive external powers for almost all WTO matters under the Lisbon Treaty.
Nonetheless, in the three cases where EU/MS responsibility was contentious, WTO panels have categorically held that EU Member States are bound to perform all obligations incumbent upon them under the WTO Agreement (and its annexed agreements), so as long as they remain full and independent members of the WTO and irrespective of the (exclusive) powers they may have transferred to the Union in the CCP field under EU law. While this stance may grate on the ears of most EU lawyers, it is legally sound from an international law standpoint. Moreover, it also wise from a broader governance perspective: to put it bluntly, it is not for WTO dispute settlement organs to turn the WTO Agreement de facto into a 'pure' treatment concerned is required by Union law." (emphasis added). For a seemingly more flexible reading as incorporating all instances in which EU Member States act to implement EU law, see A. Delgado Casteleiro, 'The International Responsibility of the European Union -The EU Perspective: Between Pragmatism and Proceduralisation ' (2012-2013) 15 Cambridge Journal of European Legal Studies 563, at 580-581 (referring to the "EU's normative control") and 586 (referring to "implementing EU law"). 166 See Dimopoulos (2014) , at 1676, noting that, unlike in the WTO dispute settlement system (where the primary remedy is not compensation), the assumption by the EU of international responsibility for all Member State acts violating investment obligations raises very significant moral hazard concerns: "Member States may act in violation of their obligations under EU [international investment agreements], knowing that compensation will be paid by the EU and (indirectly) shared by all Member States." Arguably, similar moral hazard concerns could arise with regards to retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system, albeit this is only a secondary remedy therein (see n 152 above). 167 See section 2.2 above.
EU agreement for the purpose of international responsibility. 169 That being so, in assigning international responsibility -i.e., whether solely to the EU (EC -Computer Equipment (1998) and EC -IT Products (2010)) or jointly with (some of) its Member States (EC -Large Civil Aircraft (2011)), these WTO panels were seemingly guided by one pragmatic consideration: who has the actual power to remove (or modify) the measure found WTO-inconsistent? Therefore, it is this special feature of the WTO dispute settlement system -i.e., a clear preference for juridical restitution as a primary remedy for breaches of WTO law-that ultimately renders the internal division of competences between the EU and the Member States a relevant criterion in deciding who should be held responsible. This 'competence/remedy' model for managing EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO may thus remain a case apart, unique to that dispute settlement regime, as notably demonstrated by the more cautious EU approach emerging in the investment field.
However, and contrary to what other scholars appear to suggest, 170 it is not a foregone conclusion that the EU is always the one and only entity with the actual power to provide juridical restitution in the WTO dispute settlement system, just because it has exclusive external competence for nearly all WTO matters. This is undoubtedly the case when it comes to highly harmonised segments of the CCP (e.g., tariffs and customs matters), where Member States conduct is strictly confined to implementing directly applicable EU legislation: evidently, the EU only can amend/withdraw such legislation if found WTO-inconsistent. And yet, as we have seen, it is less straightforward why the EU would also have such an exclusive remedial capacity for breaches of WTO law in cases where its normative control over Member State action is more limited, or indeed entirely absent: for instance, why couldn't the EU Member States concerned withdraw themselves their own subsidies, or regulatory measures permitted but not required by EU law, if found WTO-inconsistent? In fact, from the perspective of providing juridical restitution, it is not the division of external (i.e., treaty-making) competences between EU and Member States that is of primordial importance, but of internal (treaty-infringing/treaty-performing) competences and these are not within the exclusive regulatory domain of the Union for all subject matters covered by WTO law. 171 This being so, insofar as EU Member States are targeted as a respondent in a given WTO dispute and hold the power to end an eventual breach of their WTO obligations, there is no cogent reasons why WTO dispute settlement organs should rely on EU control mechanisms 172 instead of making them directly responsible and accountable under WTO law. Indeed, it could be argued that this would not only make little sense from an international law perspective, but also be undesirable for intra-EU 'fairness' considerations. To retake the logic underpinning the EU Regulation on financial responsibility in the ISDS context, 173 why would it be any more 'fair' in the WTO for the EU alone to face the consequences of international responsibility (including possible retaliation) en bloc, when a breach of WTO law is caused by 169 In a post-Lisbon setting, this would have likely been the practical consequence had WTO dispute settlement organs accepted the Commission's proposition (supported by some EU law scholars) that the apportionment of obligations should strictly follow the distribution of external competences under EU law and be the decisive factor in assigning international responsibility (see section 2.2 above) 170 See note 130 above. 171 See sections 2.3 and 4.1 above, pointing to several policy areas covered by WTO law where there has been (as of yet) no full harmonisation of national laws, because they have been only partially regulated at EU level (e.g., minimum standard Directives in the areas of consumer and environmental protection), or even not at all (e.g., certain forms of internal taxation). 172 Again, doing so would de facto turn the WTO Agreement into a 'pure' EU agreement, whereby EU Member States are not seen as WTO members in their own right and bearers of the contractual obligations, but mere vehicles for carrying out the EU's obligations under WTO law.the discretionary (i.e., where EU law merely authorises) or fully autonomous (i.e., where there is no EU legislation) decision of one (or some) of its Member States?
In closing, it is important to underline that the issue of EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO is not, of course, a purely legal question but one highly political for all players involved. For the EU, the capacity to speak with one voice and assert its exclusive responsibility in the WTO dispute settlement system is certainly instrumental in forging its own identity as a leading trade actor and power on the global stage, 174 but also important at a more practical level. 175 At the same time, it appears politically unviable for (some) EU Member States to even consider relinquishing their independent membership of the WTO. 176 For their part, other WTO members may target the EU and its Member States jointly as respondents not solely out of genuine legal concerns, 177 but strategically as a means to challenge the Union's unity and leadership in the WTO. 178 In these circumstances, the EU and its Member States may increasingly find themselves at a crossroad between maintaining their 'mixed' membership of the WTO while claiming the EU's 'exclusive' responsibility in its dispute settlement system. Indeed, aside from voting and other political considerations, 179 one may well question whether there is still a legal need, as a matter of EU law, 180 for the parallel double EU/MS membership of the WTO members: in other words, have EU exclusive powers under the CCP now become sufficiently broad for the Union to assume alone the obligations of WTO membership? 181 And if so, does it have effective internal mechanisms at its disposal to ensure implementation of those obligations by its Member States?
182 It is not the purpose of the present chapter to engage with these convoluted questions of EU law, nor to take a position on the highly controversial and politically sensitive issue of whether the Member States should remain WTO members in their own right. 183 What is here submitted is that it is for the EU and its Member States to address these matters in-house, and meanwhile the WTO dispute settlement organs have made a judicious choice not to interfere.
